INTRODUCTION
The subject matter of the following notes, devoted to the memory of Professor Karol Wolfke, is obviously inspired by the scholarly specialism of the author of Custom in Present International Law 1 ; and their Nuremberg context, by the events concerning the Russian action against Ukraine.
The name of the Bavarian town, Nuremberg, has of course aquired symbolic meaning and points generally to the post-war trials of war criminals. The shape of that trials was determined by the Moscow Declaration On German Atrocities, issued by "the Big Three" -the USA, the USSR and Great Britainon 1 November 1943. Following the principle established in the Declaration, the defendants were to be tried in courts of the countries where they had committed their "abominable deeds" and "according to the laws of these liberated countries"
2 . This also included courts in France and the USSR. As it transpired, defendants were also tried by military tribunals set up by the USA and Great Britain within their respective occupied zones in Germanyas the occupying powers were entitled to do both under the Hague Convention and the common law. Subsequently the tribunals obtained the territorial and material jurisdiction of courts "of these liberated countries", because -as stated by Franciszek Ryszka -the principle of the Moscow Declaration was formally extended to include both of the Anglo-Saxon occupying powers 3 . Thus that DOI: 10.1515 DOI: 10. /wrlae-2018 principle initiated the scale of action, which involved thousands of trials and tens of thousands of convictions.
And yet the historic significance of the Nuremburg precedent derives from an exception to that principle. The so-called major criminals, "whose offences have no particular geographical localisation", were to be punished on the basis of "the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies" 4 . This decision was taken by the powers alone (by then including France) who, by force of the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, created the International Military Tribunal. At the same time -in the Charter annexed to the Agreement -they accomplished a momentous act of codification of international law. Bert V. A. Röling, the Dutch lawyer and judge at the Tokyo Tribunal, called the resolutions of the Statute "a revolution in legal thought" and a "turning point" in the development of law 5 .
The judgement of the IMT could indeed herald a breakthrough in international practice. For the very first time, high officers of state were brought to justice for policy carried out by that state. They were convicted not only for war crimes sensu stricto, but also for initiating a war of aggression (crime against peace) as well as for acts against their own citizens (crimes against humanity 6 ). This was -in the words of the Tribunal -"the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation". And "crimes against international law" -as was advanced at another point -"are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced". Finally -and the Tribunal considered this "the very essence of the Charter" -"individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State"
7 .
In the motives of the judgement, the Tribunal devoted most space to the basis of the conviction for crime against peace. It found this necessary "in view of the great importance of the questions of law involved". Widely cited examples of international agreements and declarations, in which states condemned war, served in this case as proof of the existence not of a custom but of a treaty norm. For in effect it was found that, as expressed in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, "the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who plan and wage such a war... are committing a crime in so doing". On passed by the UN General Assembly, have a law-making character. The notice provision (Article XV) refers solely to procedure. The opposite conclusion would consequently denote the legalisation of genocide.
As we know, the IMT did not hear another trial. But in the years 1946-1949 -in the same courtroom, No. 600 of the Nuremberg Palace of Justice, where Göring and others were tried -twelve other trials did take place. This time in front of six American Military Tribunals. Despite the name, they were in fact civil criminal courts with professional judges holding the highest legal qualifications 14 . They were set up for a single purpose: to hear the cases of those major criminals who had avoided the IMT trial and who were in the hands of Americans. While the Tribunals were created by an act of internal law -by order of the Military Government American Zone of Occupation -their jurisdiction was defined by international agreement, i.e. by Law No. 10 of the Allied Control Council. In the material-legal respect this corresponded to the Charter -except that to the three categories of crime it added a fourth: "Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal" 15 . The judicature of the American Tribunals was basically in agreement with the legal position of the IMT. When refuting the argument of lack of jurisdiction, the Tribunals invoked Law No. 10, which -like the Charter -is "the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation". The Tribunal in the Hostages case described the crimes defined in it (with, it will be seen, one exception) as "crimes under pre-existing rules of International Law -some by conventional law and some by customary law" 16 . In the Krupp case -referring to the IMT statement that the Hague Regulations had by 1939 become customary law -the Tribunal added that they were, "therefore, binding on Germany not only as Treaty Law but also as Customary Law" 17 . The Tribunal also expressed the belief that the so-called Martens Clause, included in the Preamble to the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, "is much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause, making the usages established among civilised nations, the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience into the legal yardstick to be applied if and when the provisions of the Convention and the Regulations annexed to it do not cover specific cases occurring in warfare, or concomitant to warfare" 18 .
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Even so, certain characteristic differences of opinion were noticeable. For example, while in the Einsatzgruppen case the Tribunal took Law No. 10 as the basis for its jurisdiction because it was "in conformity with international law" 19 , another Tribunal, (the Flick case), to some extent reversed the thinking. While stating that Law No. 10 constitutes "a statement of international law, which previously -the Tribunal added -was at least partly uncodified", at the same time found it necessary to qualify this with the following stipulation: "No act is adjudged criminal by the Tribunal which was not criminal under international law as it existed when the act was committed" 20 .
A similar yet rather different position was taken by Tribunal in the IG-Farben case. "Control Council Law No. 10 -we read -cannot be made [the] basis of a determination of guilt for acts or conduct that would not have been criminal under the law as it existed at the time -and here lay the difference -of the rendition of the judgment by the IMT" 21 . In the Hostages case the Tribunal went a step further, however, and in fact questioned the judgement of the IMT with regard to the firing squad execution of hostages and collective reprisals against the civil population. In the light of both the Charter and the Law No. 10, both actions constituted war crimes. The same position was also taken by the IMT in its judgement. Without entering into an open debate, the American Tribunal expressed the view that within some strictly defined limits the rules of customary law allowed such practices: namely in circumstances when their goal was thereby to achieve law enforcement in the occupied territory. Hostage taking and even reprisal killings -we read in this judgement -might constitute an allowed line of action against guerilla attacks. Certainly the American Tribunal treated this as a last resort and defined the detailed conditions which should have been met beforehand. It granted that the idea of killing "an innocent person [...] for the criminal act of another is abhorrent to every natural law", and called any norm that allows for it "a barbarous relic of ancient times". However -this Tribunal distinctly stated -"it is not our province to write International Law as we would have it -we must apply it as we find it" 22 . The theses of this Tribunal, which had by no means mitigated the severity of its sentence, gave rise to much criticism in both scholarship and public opinion -particularly in Yugoslavia, which it concerned, as well as the Soviet Union and Poland. Indeed, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, signed in 1949, prohibited The IMT did not make a clear distinction between "war crimes sensu stricto" and "crimes against humanity". Besides, to a large extent their characteristics overlapped 24 . The judgement states only that "insofar as the inhumane acts charged in the Indictment, and committed after the beginning of the war, did not constitute war crimes, they were [...] crimes against humanity" 25 . And since the war crimes are by definition perpetrated against an enemy population, simple logic points to the differentia specifica of crimes against humanity: their victims must have included the perpetrator's own civil population 26 . The position of the American Tribunals left no doubts in this respect. In their judgements they clearly isolated criminal acts of the Nazi authorities against their own citizens 27 . According to the Tribunal in the Jurist case the provisions of Article II p. 1 c of Law No. 10 (like Article 6 p. c of the Charter) clearly allows it. "The intent of the statute on crimes against humanity -we read -is to punish for persecutions and the like, whether in accord with or in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated, to wit: Germany". Whilst elsewhere it added that Art. III "clearly demonstrates that acts by Germans against German nationals may constitute crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to punish" 28 . Article 6 p. c of the Charter caused fierce disputes during the London negotiations. Initially the USSR's delegates tried to reduce crimes against humanity to acts of a fascist and racist nature, i.e., to divert blame solely towards the crimes of the Third Reich 29 . This was prevented by the objections of the USA. In effect the USSR managed to achieve their goal indirectly. They managed to impose an additional condition which limited the criminality of such acts to those committed "in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal" 30 . quality. Moscow became worried that a semi-colon used in the English and French texts 31 could still extend liability into peacetime and demanded a lastminute rectification. Thanks to a special protocol -de facto an additional agreement -signed in Berlin on 6 October 1945, the semi-colon was replaced by a comma, which was applied in the Russian version by the extra-cautious USSR delegates 32 . This seems to have been the first agreement in history made because of a comma.
The condition imposed by the USSR restricted IMT jurisdiction to time of war; essentially the war whose crimes were the subject of those proceedings. The Tribunal judgement altered this by also including preparations for war within the liability 33 . However, the judgement did not cover all those crimes perpetrated before the War against the citizens of the Third Reich -including political opponents and the Jewish population. "The Tribunal is of the opinion -it statesthat revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a general declaration that the acts before 1939 were crimes against humanity within the meaning of the Charter"
34 . This quotation, and particularly the expression, "within the meaning of the Charter", may suggest that in the Tribunal's view these acts did qualify as crimes against humanity: i.e. that in this case the scope of the law went beyond this court's powers of execution as prescribed by the Charter. For it is properas was emphasised in the Jurist case -"to distinguish between the rules of common international law which are of universal and superior authority on the one hand, and the provisions for enforcement of those rules which are by no means universal on the other" 35 . Anyway, the IMT used the term "crime" -a strictly defined legal termwith regard to those acts; this could not be accidental. And while stating that in the Third Reich "political opponents were murdered", and that it operated a "policy of terror", a "policy of persecution, repression and murder of civilians", the Tribunal simply stated the facts of the case, which was within the remit of Article 6, p. c of the Charter 36 . Indeed this whole passage was preceded by the phrase: "With regard to crimes against humanity", which clearly indicated the crimes the IMT referred to 37 . It did not, however, indicate the legal basis which would make the crimes punishable when committed not in connection with war. 31 Art. 6 (c) "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated". Qtd. in: Moscow Conference. 32 IMT Judgement (n 7). 34 IMT Judgement (n 7). 35 Justice case (n 28) 37. 36 IMT Judgment (n 7). For although the Tribunal referred (in the excerpt quoted earlier) to "the general principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts" 38 , this, as can be seen, was only in the context of war.
A significant pointer in this respect was contained in two judgements of the American Tribunals -in the Hostages case and in the Einsatzgruppen case. It should be noted here that the condition restricting the punishability of crimes against humanity to war events -the expression: "in execution of, or in connection with" -was removed from the regulations of Article II, p. 1 c of Law No. 10 by the Allied Control Council ("deliberately", as noted in the Jurists case 39 ). It proves the fact that this expression did not constitute an essential element of this regulation. The simultaneous ommission of the words "before or during the war" must have meant that crimes against humanity are punishable in general, including times of peace.
The first of the two judgements contains a significant argument concerning the meaning of "the general principles of justice". This is because the Tribunal in the Hostages case found it "advisable to briefly state the general nature, of International Law and the sources from which its principles can be ascertained". As its starting point the Tribunal stated that the term "customs and practices accepted by civilised nations generally" used in the law of nations is not limited "to the laws of war only. It applies as well to fundamental principles of justice which have been accepted and adopted by civilised nations generally". Therefore, if they are accepted generally as such "by most nations in their municipal law, its declaration as a rule of International Law would seem to be fully justified. There is convincing evidence that this not only is but has been the rule"
40 . Since the defendants in this trial were accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, and since in the case of the former the Tribunal referred to the Hague rules, it can be assumed that "the rule" discussed in the final conclusion referred to crimes against humanity.
The Tribunal in the Einsatzgruppen case expressed its position in a more complex manner. First it pointed to custom. In refuting the argument concerning violations of the Latin maxim nullun crimen sine lege, the Tribunal pointed out that "the 'lex' referred to is not restricted to statutory law". This is because it evolves "effectively through custom and usage", as well as -it added -"through the application of 'Common law'". And that reason does not make it "less binding" than the codes, treaties and conventions
41 . Yet at another point it states: "an evaluation of international right and wrong, which heretofore existed only in the heart of mankind, has now been written into the books of men as the law of humanity" 42 . Admittedly the words "written into the books of men" could mean that the material-legal basis of crimes against humanity was the London codification. 38 IMT Judgement (n 7). 39 Justice case (n 28) 41. 40 Hostages Case (n 16), 49. 41 Einsatzgruppen Case (n 19) 458. 42 Einsatzgruppen Case (n 19) 497. This, however, would clash with the belief that the Charter and Law No. 10 were an expression of the law that was already in force. This is also contradicted by the following statement by this Tribunal: "The specific enactments for the trial of war criminals, which have governed the Nuernberg trials, have only provided a machinery for the actual application of international law theretofore existing" 43 . And, concluding the previously quoted thought, the Tribunal added that "the law of humanity... is not restricted to events of war. It envisages the protection of humanity at all times"
44 . Since -as we further read -the Allied Control Council had removed the restriction connected to war, "the present Tribunal has jurisdiction to try all crimes against humanity as long known and understood under the general principles of criminal law" (emphasis by the present writer) 45 . The underlined fragment proves that the position of both Tribunals coincided and that, to them, apart from custom, the source of crimes against humanity were also the "general principles of criminal law".
The views of the two tribunals confirm the hypothesis that the criminal activities whose victims prior to 1939 were the Third Reich's citizens -although excluded from the jurisdiction of the IMT -did qualify as crimes against humanity. The general character of the legal norm expressed in Article VI, p. c of the Charter confirmed the exclusion of this jurisdictive condition from the analogous regulation of Law No. 10. Thus the regulation became the basis for punishing any "inhuman acts" and "persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds" carried out against the civil population in different parts of the world after 1945; this included crimes which were defined by Polish legislation as "Stalinist" 46 . In the Polish judicature relating to these crimes there is an example which confirms the above conclusion as well as the reasoning leading to it. Let us add the fact that Poland included the Nuremberg norms in its legal system. It also ratified the Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Thus in 1998 the Regional Court in Warsaw referred, amongst others, to the Charter of the "International War[!] Tribunal in Nuremberg" when rejecting an argument concerning the statute of limitations in the appeal case of Adam Humer and others. True, in its judgement the Court did not specifically mention the regulation of Law No. 10 discussed here, but it clearly referred to its content when taking the view that "persecution for political reasons, which was the case here" is punishable under international law 47 . In May 1993 the Security Council passed the statute of an ad hoc international tribunal, the first since Nuremberg, for the purpose of trying war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. One and a half years later the Council passed the statute of a second tribunal ad hoc, which was to punish acts of genocide in the territory of Rwanda. The Statute of the Yugoslav tribunal still made the punishment of crimes against humanity dependent on their connection with war. The Rwandan Statute no longer bore this condition. The final "i" in this evolution was dotted by the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav tribunal in its sentence review in the case of Dusko Tadić. "It is by now a settled rule of customary international law -it states -that crimes against humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict... and any conflict at all" 48 . From the perspective of the hypothesis presented here, the significant question is: "Since when?"
The IMT judgement, as well as the judgements of the American Tribunals, have overshadowed the contributions of the National Courts and the Occupation Tribunals to the punishment of war criminals. Yet -to quote Mieczysław Szerer, the Polish delegate to the War Crimes Commission of the United Nations in London -every single trial, even that of the most wretched criminal and devoid of any "flavour of sensation", was a step towards "coining the new international criminal law" 49 . A similar view was expressed by Lord Wright, the chairman of the Commission 50 . But even in those cases decided by national courts on the basis of the domestic penal code, it was still essential to establish whether the perpetrator had contravened the regulations of the IV Convention; or strictly speaking of its annexe, the "Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land". Thus a norm of international law had a decisive influence here.
In fact the National Courts also referred to international custom. The judgement passed in Poland by the Najwyższy Trybunał Narodowy (the Supreme National Tribunal), against Artur Greiser, states for example that the defendant's acts were also deliberately directed against "the laws and customs of war" 51 . In another judgement, passed against Joseph Bühler, the NTN referred to the Martens Clause. It should be noted that the Tribunal stated on this occasion that the Clause imposed a legal obligation on the parties at war to adhere to its letter 52 . The signatories of the Convention did not wish any unforeseen events to be left to the discretion of the military leaders, as was noted sarcastically by Józef Giebułtowicz, the author of a slim volume on the responsibility of war criminals. Before World War II he was a Polish envoy in Oslo, and subsequently a prisoner in Majdanek Concentration Camp 53 . Szerer's words primarily seem to concern the Tribunals of the USA and Great Britain. Unlike the Nuremberg Tribunals, these acted on the narrower basis of the Hague Convention, meaning they tried war crimes sensu stricto, i.e., only those committed against the Allied Nationals. Using the few and rather imprecise 54 points of Section III ("Military authority over the territory of the hostile state") of the Regulations they had to establish by means of legal interpretation whether criminal phenomena -unknown to the authors of the Regulations -constituted war crimes in the light of those rules.
The incompatibility of those rules with the reality of the criminal politics of the Third Reich is best evidenced by Article 46 of the Regulations, which played a key role in the Nuremberg judicature: "Family honour and rights, individual life, and private property, as well as religious convictions and worship, must be respected" 55 . Nonetheless this did serve as the basis for rulings against the perpetrators of all types of crimes that victimised residents of the occupied territories. And this was not a case of drastic innovation; as Hersch Lauterpacht wrote in his commentary on one of the judgements, "it is only the novelty and the enormity of the outrage which creates the impresion of novelty" 56 . The tribunals of the two Anglo-Saxon occupying powers did not give reasons for their judgements. However the adversarial process allowed for their legal position (i.e. whose arguments they accepted, prosecution or defence) to be inferred from the rulings themselves. In the American procedure other indicators of the tribunal's position were the comments -extremely important, because objective -formulated during the process of the verification of the judgement. In the British procedure a similar significance was assumed by the Summing up of the Judge Advocate, who from an "entirely impartial position" advised the tribunal "on matters of substantive and procedural law. He must also, unless both he and the court think it unnecessary, sum up the evidence before the Court deliberated on its findings" 57 . 60 . The prosecutor, a Texan lawyer with a Polish name, Colonel Leon Jaworski, called for the sentence. The defence was proving the innocence of the defendants, stating that international law lacked a norm that would justify their conviction. "It would be an anomalous situation -Jaworski retorted -in fact a tragic one, if our network of international law were so inherently defective as to be powerless to bring to justice the murders of over 400 victims" 61 . Giebułtowicz, quoted above, put it in similar terms. It must not be assumed, he wrote, that the law of nations cannot find "a solution of a given problem within the strict scope of the law" 62 , i.e., the basis for the punishment of evident crimes. Both prosecutor and author were pointing here to custom. Continuing his striking speech, Jaworski immediately added: "Maybe my distinguished adversaries have not given consideration to the fact that there is a great body, a great part of international law that is based entirely on unwritten law... that has grown up because of custom and usages among nations" 63 . Giebułtowicz completed this line of reasoning by citing the Martens Clause 64 . It seems that both opinions expressed the way of thinking which formed the basis of Nuremberg. At least within the meaning indicated by Professor Wolfke in his comments on the subjective elements of custom. While discussing the various meanings ascribed in theory to the Latin maxim opinio iuris sive necessitatis, he also mentions those interpretations -most, in his view, generalwhich refer "to a general sense of law, social needs, morality, etc" 65 . In the Justice case such motifs were presented in a very interesting way with reference to just one -but extremely significant -aspect of crimes against humanity. "The force of circumstance -we read in the judgment -the grim fact of worldwide interdependence, and the moral pressure of public opinion -have resulted in an international recognition that certain crimes against humanity committed under 58 Bundesarchiv Koblenz, unit: "AllProz. Nazi authority against German nationals constituted violations not solely of statute law but also of common international law" 66 . Stating that the Hague Convention had already applied before World War II as common law, Jaworski was about a year ahead of the IMT opinion quoted earlier. Thus he refuted another argument of the defence, who maintained that the Regulations provided no basis for charging the defendants with committing war crimes against Polish citizens, because Poland was not party to the Convention. True, some countries -Jaworski stated, mentioning Bulgaria and Italy -had not accepted the Convention via a sufficiently formal procedure. "But on through the years all of those nations began to invoke the Hague Convention, they acquiesced in it, they lived by it, they used it, they referred to it and it has been a recognized convention binding as between all nations". Therefore he took it for granted that Poland was party to the Convention, and he found Article 46 of the Regulations "most apropos, strikingly so, to the very charge that has been leveled against the accused in this case". There could, he concluded, be no doubt that according to international law the crimes levelled against the defendants were punishable 67 . His adversary in the trial maintained his position and even expressed the belief that the prosecution had merely managed to demonstrate "how inadequate the network of international law is and how defective". But the verdict fully confirmed the position of the prosecutionincluding the precedential argument that the requirement included in Article 46 to protect the lives of the residents of an occupied country also applies to those who have been deported by the occupying force to its own territory.
The challenge that the Hague Convention did not apply to Polandadditionally supported by reference to the doctrine of subjugation -also appeared in the proceedings of the British Tribunals. In the trial (which was taking place at the same time) of 45 executioners from Auschwitz and Belsen-Bergen, the defence on points of law relating to international law was led by a controversial Professor from the University of London, H.A. Smith, an expert on the subject 68 . He argued that part of Poland was annexed; the rest was transformed into the General Governorate; the German law was in place; the defendants had to implement their authorities' decisions. "The Polish State and Polish nation had ceased to exist", he stated ruthlessly, though carefully leaving out -as can be seen -the Eastern part of Poland, which at that time was annexed by the Soviet Union 69 .
Admittedly this trial was a success for the defence in that 15 out 45 defendants were acquitted by the Tribunal 70 . However, the judgement fully confirmed the interpretation of the existing law as presented by the prosecutor, Colonel T. M. Backhouse: "The laws and usages of war provided for the proper treatment not only of the prisoners of war but of the civilian citizens of the 66 Justice case (n 28) 45. 67 Hadamar-Transcript (n 58) 6-7. 68 countries occupied by a belligerent". In reference to the latter he mentioned Article 46, adding that in the days when the Article was formulated "a military body like the S.S. was not thought of". He dealt with the arguments concerning Poland by remarking that they did not constitute a defence, because the German authorities used the same treatment towards the residents of countries they did not intend to annexe. He stated that the very fact that both camps -Auschwitz and Belsen-Bergen -had imprisoned citizens of the allied countries was sufficient to establish that "the acts set out in the charges were undoubtedly war crimes" 71 . We should add that the defence counsel (on this occasion a German) in another British trial developed the argument of subjugation further by stating that Poland had capitulated. "Poland never capitulated", he was interrupted by the Judge Advocate: "There was a Polish Government in London throughout the whole of the war, and therefore anything that was done by Germany in the way of occupation was imposed by force and not by any treaty rights". The defence counsel still tried to argue his point, suggesting that it was still an open matter and it would be better to wait and see the opinion of the Nuremburg Tribunal. "Doctor, I do not want to interrupt you, but I have indicated that I will advise the Court that they could not recognise in international law any laws that were imposed on Poland by Germany after the collapse of Poland" 72 . The IMT definitively settled the question of subjugation. It found it unnecessary to consider the hypothesis of whether this doctrine could even apply, bearing in mind that the conquest had occurred as the result of a war of aggression. However -as we then read -"The doctrine was never considered to be applicable so long as there was an army in the field attempting to restore the occupied countries to their true owners" (emphasis by the present writer). The IMT stated further -sealing the defendants' guilt -that "the doctrine could not apply to any territories occupied after the 1st September, 1939" 73 . There is no need to prove that the words "an army in the field" could also refer to an allied army. Whereas the phrase emphasised here can be understood as the expression of an opinion about practice considered as law, i.e, the second of the two elements constituting a customary legal norm 74 . Let us return to the quoted exchange of opinions. This took place during the first of two trials against 18 persons responsible for the deaths of c. 500 Polish and Russian infants 75 . They were removed from their mothers -who were forced labourers -immediately after birth and were placed in premises entirely devoid of basic nursing facilities and equipment; in one case there was not even running water. Major G.L.D Draper, the prosecutor in both trials, accused all the 71 Belsen case (n 68) 8, 104-105. 72 Rühen (n 75) 13 th day of the trial 3-4. 73 IMT Judgement (n 7). 74 defendants of "committing a war crime in that they... in violation of the laws and usages of war were concerned in killing by wilful neglect a number of children of Polish and Russian nationals". He labelled this crime "peculiarly obnoxious and inhuman" 76 . Draper, pointing to Article 46 as the legal basis for a conviction, used the following interpretation: "It is considered as part of the argument for the prosecution that family life had come into Germany as a necessary consequence of the operation of war, namely that Germany having occupied the territory of Poland, and large areas of Russia, and then having brought female workers into Germany to work for Germany during the war, is equally bound to respect family life and new life born of workers, whether they are in their own country or whether they are brought into Germany" 77 . On this basis both trials resulted in guilty verdicts. Thus the precedent-setting judgment in the Hadamar case, which found that Article 46 of the Regulations protected forced female labourers deported to German territory, also extended to their children born there.
As for the illegality of the deportations themselves, the prosecution deduced this clearly from custom -unlike the IMT and Tribunal in the Krupp case, which in this respect referred to Article 52 of the Hague Regulations. Admittedly this Article allowed for requisition and services on the part of the population, but only within the local needs of the occupying army and "in proportion to the resources of the country and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the obligation to take part in military operations against their own country"
78 . "We refer -Draper said during the first trial -to the well-known custom and rule of international law that it is forbidden in time of war to deport slave labour from the country that you have occupied by your army to the country which is the occupying Power" 79 . During the second trial he stated briefly that the deportations constituted "a breach of the customary rules of international law" 80 . Thus this view was at the basis of both these documented rulings. The US and British occupation tribunals usually heard criminal cases in which the victims were not nationals of the occupying powers. In the British trials the defence did not make use of this. Indeed, in the official commentary on one judgement we read: "the United Kingdom has a direct interest in punishing the perpetrators of crimes if the victim was a national of an ally engaged in common struggle against a common enemy". Reference was made to the "general doctrine called Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, under which every independent State has, in International Law, jurisdiction to punish pirates and war criminals in its custody regardless of the nationality of the victim or the place where the offence was committed" 81 . However, the American defence lawyer in the Hadamar case made a submission at the very start of the trial that the Military Commission could only 76 Velpke (n 58) 8, 338. 77 Rühen (n 75) 2 nd day of the trial 13. 78 Krupp case (n 17) 145. 79 Velpke (n 58) 8. 80 Rühen (n 75) 2 nd day of the trial 14. 81 The Zyklon B Case, Case No. 9, in I Law Reports (1947) 
try crimes committed against soldiers or nationals of the USA, or possibly against residents of territories subject to American rule, such as the Philipines. He justified this by means of the following nimbly phrased formula: "There is no rule of law in International Law which gives authority to one nation to try and punish nationals of another nation for committing offenses against nationals of other nations". On this occasion Jaworski also invoked custom: "it is a well established custom of the laws of war that the jurisdiction of the military commission is not teritorial. The right to punish for such an offense proceeds upon the well established principle that allies or co-belligerents constitute but a single side of an armed struggle".
The fundamental issue, he said, is the fact of contravention of international law, which is an "offense against the laws of war". Contravention of international law constitutes "a matter of general interest and concern". Whether committed by their own forces or those of the enemy, "civilized cobelligerents have an interest in the punishment of offenders against the laws of war" 82 . At the same time Jaworski invoked the doctrine of the Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes; specifically the arguments put forward by Willard B. Cowles in an article on this subject recently published in the USA 83 . Consequently the chair of the Commission ruled that the Commission did have the jurisdiction to hear criminal cases in which the victims were Polish and Russian labourers 84 . We should add that Cowles' theses were frequently called on in the American war crimes case law. His views had a clearly directive value -to a degree which allows them to be treated as an almost integral part of that case law.
The ruling in the Hadamar case turned out to be final. It was confirmed definitively by the General Military Government Court in its judgement against Dachau concentration camp personnel. The authors of the opinion, which was prepared in the verification process, presented the motives of the Tribunal's decision in a way that linked both the material and the formal bases of the jurisdiction. "It was held in the Hadamar case that since the inhabitants of an occupied country are entitled to be respected in their persons, family, rights and lives, it is a violation of international law and a war crime to unlawfully kill such persons. It was further decided that criminals guilty of such offenses may be tried by a belligerent power into whose hands they come, whether that power be the one whose subjects were the victims, or an allied power. In that case -they stated towards the end -the United States was an ally of Poland and the Soviet Union" 85 . The trial of the Dachau personnel was the first in a series of six main trials 86 -which took place in the years 1945-1947 within the actual location of the former Dachau concentration camp -against personnel from all the camps liberated by the Americans. In several trials that followed, and particularly in the trial of Buchenwald personnel (11 April -17 August 1947) 87 , in the course of which the jurisdiction dispute reached its climax, the defence replaced its former argument with two others, similar in substance. The first challenged the Tribunal's jurisdiction in relation to crimes committed prior to the USA joining the war. The second, solely concerning mass atrocities, tried to restrict the jurisdiction only to acts commited within the American Zone of Occupation.
According to the defence, the latter argument was based on a recently issued directive (14 October 1946) by the Military Government, which indeed indicated that the jurisdiction of the Military Government Courts generally only covered crimes committed against Americans. The defence lawyer, experienced in the Hadamar case, conceded that the tribunals were not "restricted in their jurisdiction by territorial limits". Therefore they could -after occupying a country -try cases of contravention of the laws of war which were committed prior to the occupation. However, the norm that determined this, he argued -clearly having in mind a customary norm -also assumes that the jurisdiction ends when the victorious army's occupation of the country ceases 88 . The point of this argument lay in the fact that the Buchenwald camp, though liberated by American army units, was situated in the previously-demarcated USSR zone, and had been evacuated by the Americans in early July 1945 89 . The defence position did not succeed in challenging the jurisdiction, either with regard to time or place. The first argument was dismissed by the Tribunal on the basis of the principle of universality of jurisdiction. The explanation presented in this matter by the prosecutor, Colonel William Denson, concurred with Jaworski's arguments; this was understandable in that both lawyers relied on Cowles' theses. On this occasion Denson expressed a thought which is still relevant seventy years later: "The members of the family of nations cannot look with indiffernce upon violations of International Law, if peace in any form is to be preserved" 90 . The Tribunal dismissed the second argument too. True, Denson had to admit that the regulation cited from the Directive was "a little ambiguous". He stated, however, that even in that form it "does not deprive this court of the power to try a case arising in a zone other than that which is now accupied by the American authorities". He referred here to the view of the Deputy Theatre Judge 86 Here were heard the trials of the members of the personnel of the 'parent' camps; those who were indicted with the most typical functions in the criminal mechanism of the camps and whose responsibility best characterised that mechanism. 87 Advocate who -in order to clarify the ambiguity -officially confirmed such an interpretation 91 . In the course of the judgement verification, it was established that the directive invoked by the defence clearly allowed for the punishment of perpetrators of mass atrocities committed outside the American zone's boundaries 92 . Consequently, when in another trial (of the personnel of Mittelbau-"Dora") the defence advanced a similar argument, the Tribunal dismissed it without even waiting for an objection from the prosecutor 93 . In all the trials against the camps' SS personnel, the prosecution produced the same indictment: "Violation of the Laws and Usages of War". On many occasions the prosecution also invoked contents of Article 46. The prosecutor in the Flossenbürg trial, while presenting the cruel treatment of the prisoners, referred to this Article expressis verbis and stated that it constituted "a codification of a universally recognized rule" 94 . Whereas the prosecutor in the above-mentioned Dachau case (again Colonel Denson), when called on to indicate the basis of the Tribunal's jurisdiction (the defence claimed the prosecution's position was confusing at this point), did not restrain his sarcasm. "I don't think -he began -that the court is particularly confused about that". Then, reminding the defence that the defendants in this trial were accused of violating international law, Denson quoted points (a) to (c) of Article 38 Statute of the International Court of Justice! So, he said, if the facts established in the trial fitted into the provisions of treaties or conventions, or into custom recognised by the USA or "the laws of the United States... they will be applied" 95 . The Tribunal supplemented this with the following statement, which had been made in the initial phase of the proceedings: "although appointed by a conquering nation as a military government court in a conquered land, it sits in judgement under international law and under such laws of humanity and customs of human behavior that is recognized commonly by civilized people" 96 . The statement was cited as evidence that, when it came to issues of jurisdiction and the sources of law, the position of the tribunals trying war criminals was consistent 97 . Additionally, the fact that the Tribunal placed both "international law" and the "customs and laws of humanity" (i.e., the resolutions of the Martens Clause) on the same level could lead to the conclusion that it found the obligations resulting from the resolutions legally binding en par with the Hague humanity, Moscow wished to restrict the precedent value of Nuremberg to the minimum. (Incidentally, the fact that it agreed to ratify Law No. 10, which contained an analogical regulation, was not effectively threatening, because this was to be realised within its own occupation zone). Besides it was certain that the USSR would block any initiative attempting to establish a permanent mechanism for punishing international crimes.
It does not seem, however, that the USSR's Western partners were really aiming for this, and Jackson's words should be taken at best as symptomatic of an American propensity for verbal idealism. We can pass over the fact that at some point the leaders of the "Big Three" quite seriously considered the possibility of simply executing Hitler and his assistants by firing squad 108 . They finally decided on a judicial process, whatever Stalin understood by that. It is symptomatic of the three powers' attitude to the Nuremberg precedent that an attempt to apply the regulations of Law No. 10, as the "uniform legal basis" for the punishment of war criminals in occupied German territories, simply misfired.
Only the French introduced Law No. 10, for this purpose setting up the Tribunal Général du Gouvernement Militaire pour la Zone Française d'Occupation en Allemange, with its seat in Rastat 109 . Actually Moscow also chose to take this step by putting sixteen SS men from the Sachsenhausen camp before a military tribunal in Berlin (October 1947). But it was an isolated gesture, which -along with the unusual setting given to the trial -suggests a propagandistic motive. Meanwhile London clearly cut itself off from Nuremberg law. The British tribunals would continue to operate on the basis of the Royal Warrant of George VI, issued on 4 June 1945. The commentary on the regulations issued on the basis of the Warrant states that crimes which the IMT Charter "calls 'crimes against peace' and 'crimes against humanity'" are not covered 110 . Although the American Tribunals in Nuremberg acted on the basis of regulations set out in the Law No. 10, this was not a matter of choice. It was forced by circumstances and fitted into the narrow frame of personal jurisdiction of the IMT. In their own practice the "Big Three" preferred to stick to the traditional notion of war crimes and to the Hague bases for punishment. The Soviet position, as Georg Ginsburgs, the author of Moscow's Road to Nuremberg, put it: "was in principio, quite orthodox, being based essentially on the postulates of the Hague and Geneva agreements" 111 . Besides, the Soviet model of the war criminals processes was limited to its own state territory.
Even so, in December 1946 the General Assembly announced that it would start work towards creating a permanent criminal tribunal and enacting a "Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind". The work began 113 . Thus in 1954, after discussing two prepared proposals, the General Assembly voted by a majority to adjourn their examination until such time as a definition of aggression was enacted. In fact such a definition was enacted twenty years later, but it did not become legally binding 114 .
The open hostility with which Moscow approached both projects made it possible to blame Moscow alone for their failure. However in Summer 1998, when the diplomatic conference in Rome decided to establish a permanent International Criminal Court, not only did Russia, the USSR's legal successor, refuse to ratify its Statute, so did the USA. China failed even to sign the Statute, as did Pakistan and North Korea -both in possession of nuclear weapons -and Israel, which is suspected of possessing such weapons. It seems apparent that the states which command sufficient millitary force -by the nature of things, the greatest powers -would still rather rely on this than on the decision of an external factor, namely the court. In this respect little has changed since the First Hague Peace Conference and the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at that time. The fear of an unfavourable decision prevails over even a positive attitude to the idea of an international judiciary.
It is hard to find a better illustration of this than the position demonstrated by the USA in 1946 when they declared that in disputes with other states that have accepted a similar obligation, they will regard the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as obligatory. This is not only because they excluded from their scope of acceptance disputes "with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America"; by adding the condition, "as determined by the United States of America", they also ensured for themselves the possibility of arbitrary exclusion of new disputes in cases where there was a threat of being unsuccessful 115 . The attitute towards the International Criminal Court (founded on 1 July 2002), lacks this kind of ambiguity. From the very beginning it has been perfectly clear that its jurisdiction, which -according to Article 1 of the Statute -covers the "most serious crimes of international concern", in any case does not include the citizens of Russia, the USA and China. It is true that the two European nuclear states, France and Great Britain, have ratified the Rome Statute and have accepted such an eventuality. However, as permanent members of the Security Council they could be protected by (4) of the UN Charter, indeed fell within the lines of the warning quoted here. This reaction was restricted to some extra-legal measures. It is difficult, therefore, not to conclude that as far as the area of crime against peace is concerned, Nuremberg did not lead to any breakthrough in international practice. It proved to be an isolated episode, possible only because of the complete defeat of the Third Reich. Furthermore the fact that the world avoided a global conflict was not the result of the deterrent force of the Nuremberg gallows, but of a peculiar nuclear stalemate caused by the prospect of mutually assured annihilation.
But it would be deeply misleading to argue that matters thereby returned to their pre-Nuremberg position. Russia's actions by no means influenced the state of the law. To quote Ryszka: "A norm which is not observed, even in a majority of cases, does not cease to be law" 122 . And, according to Goodhard, nothing is changed by the fact that those "who are responsible for executing the law cannot cope with this duty" 123 . It is true that some serious scholarly objections were prompted by the thesis of the Nuremberg judgment which stated that an aggressive war was a crime in the light of international law even before the enactment of the Charter 124 . Currently, however, in the light of Article 5 of the Statute of the ICC, the objections would have no basis; and the fact that the execution of criminal responsibility for aggression has been suspended is irrelevant at this point. Therefore the conviction of Göring and the other leaders of the Third Reich will not cease to constitute a warning.
Secondly, and most importantly: in the 1990s the international criminal justice system came to be reinstated. By that time the number of victims of military conflicts, as well as of the "peace" initiatives practiced by various regimes, had reached probably 30 million 125 , and the perpetrated crimes stood comparison with the Second World War in terms both of scale and cruelty. True, Nuremberg was present in the social consciousness. It was written about in the context of Biafra and Cambodia, as well as with reference to accusations made against Shah Reza Pachlavi and others. But the Nuremberg precedent remained mostly "dormant", to employ the term used by William V. O'Brien, referring to the years 1946-1991 126 . It could be said that the events in Yugoslavia and Rwanda were the final drops that made the vessel of criminality overflow, that something reached a
